Meaning from a stylistic point of view

Stylistics is a domain where meaning assumes paramount importan-
ce. This is so because the term 'meaning' is applied not only to words,
word-combinations, sentences but also to the manner of expression into
which the matter is cast.

The linguistic term meaning has been defined in so many ways
that there appears an urgent need to clarify it; particularly in view of
the fact that in so many lexical, grammatical and phonetic SDs this
category is treated differently. It has already been mentioned that a
stylistic device_is mainly realized when a twofold application of mea-
ning is apparent.

At some period in the development of a certain trend in linguistic
theory in America, viz. descriptive linguistics, meaning was excluded
from observations in language science; it was considered an extra-lin-
guistic category.

The tendency was so strong that R. Jakobson proposed the term "se-
mantic invariant" as a substitute for 'meaning'. "If, however, you dis-
like the word meaning because it is too ambiguous," writes R. Jakobson,
"then let us simply deal with semantic invariants, no less important for
linguistic analysis than the phonemic invariants."¹

But this tendency has been ruled out by later research in language
data. One of the prominent American scientists, Wallace L. Chafe,
is right when he states that "...the data of meaning are both accessible
to linguistic explanation and crucial to the investigation of language
structure—in certain ways more crucial than the data of sound to which
linguistic studies have given such unbalanced attention."²

The problem of meaning in general linguistics deals mainly with
such aspects of the term as the interrelation between meaning and con-
cept, meaning and sign, meaning and referent. The general tendency
is to regard meaning as something stable at a given period of time. This
is reasonable, otherwise no dictionary would be able to cope with the
problem of defining the meaning of words. Moreover, no communica-
tion would be possible.

In stylistics meaning is also viewed as a category which is able to
acquire meanings imposed on the words by the context. That is why
such meanings are called contextual meanings. This cate-
gory also takes under observation meanings which have fallen out of use.

In stylistics it is important to discriminate shades or nuances of
meaning, to atomize the meaning, the component parts of which are
now called the semes, i. e. the smallest units of which meaning of
a word consists. "A proper concern for meanings," writes W. Chafe,
"should lead to a situation where, in the training of linguists, practice
in the discrimination of concepts will be given at least as much time in
the curriculum as practice in the discrimination of sounds."³

It will be shown later, in the analysis of SDs, how important it is
to discriminate between the meanings of a given word or construction
in order to adequately comprehend the idea and purport of a passage
and of a complete work.

It is now common knowledge that lexical meaning differs from
grammatical meaning in more than one way. Lexical meaning
refers the mind to some concrete concept, phenomenon, or thing of ob-
jective reality, whether real or imaginary. Lexical meaning is thus a
means by which a word-form is made to express a definite concept.

Grammatical meaning refers our mind to relations be-
tween words or to some forms of words or constructions bearing upon
their structural functions in the language-as-a-system. Grammatical
meaning can thus be adequately called "structural meaning".

There are no words which are deprived of grammatical meaning inas-
much as all words belong to some system and consequently have their

¹ Jakobson, R. The Conference of Antropologists and Linguists.— In: "Selected
Writings". The Hague, v. 2, p. 565.

² Chafe, W. L. Meaning and the Structure of Language. Chicago, 1970, p. 351.

³ I bid., p. 78.

place in the system, and also inasmuch as they always function in speech
displaying their functional properties. It is the same with sentences.
Every sentence has its own independent structural meaning. This struc-
tural meaning may in some cases be influenced or affected by the lexi-
cal meanings of the components or by intonation. In the sentence 'I shall
never go to that place again', we have a number of words with lexical
meanings (never, go, place, again) and words with only grammatical mea-
ning (I, shall, that) and also the meaning of the whole sentence, which
is defined as a structure in statement form.

But each of the meanings, being closely interwoven and interdepend-
ent, can none the less be regarded as relatively autonomous and there-
fore be analysed separately.

It is significant that words acquire different status when analysed
in isolation or in the sentence. This double aspect causes in the long
run the growth of the semantic structure of a word, especially when the
two aspects frequently interweave.

Words can be classed according to different principles: morphologi-
cal (arts of speech), semantic (synonyms, antonyms, thematic), stylis-
tic (see classification on. p 72), and other types of classification. In each
of these classifications lexical or/and grammatical meanings assume
different manifestations. In a morphological classification words are
grouped according to their grammatical meanings; in a semantic classi-
fication, according to their logical (referential) meanings, in a stylistic
classification, according to their stylistic meaning.

Lexical meanings are closely related to concepts. They are someti-
mes identified with concepts. But concept is a purely logical category,
whereas meaning is a linguistic one. In linguistics it is necessary to view
meaning as the representation of a concept through one of its proper-
ties. Concept, as is known, is versatile; it is characterized by a number
of properties. Meaning takes one of these properties and makes it repre-
sent the concept as a whole. Therefore meaning in reference to concept
becomes, as it were, a kind of metonymy. This statement is significant
inasmuch as it will further explain the stylistic function of certain mea-
nings. One and the same concept can be represented in a number of lin-
guistic manifestations (meanings) but, paradoxal though it may sound,
each manifestation causes a slight (and sometimes considerable) modi-
fication of the concept, in other words, discloses latent or unknown pro-
perties of the concept.

"The variability of meanings," writes R. Jakobson, "their manifold
and far-reaching figurative shifts, and an incalculable aptitude for mul-
tiple paraphrases are just those properties of naturall language which
induce its creativity and endow not only poetic but even scientific acti-
vities with a continuously inventive sweep. Here the indefiniteness and
creative power appear to be wholly interrelated."¹

The inner property of language, which may be defined as self-gen-
erating, is apparent in meaning. It follows then that the creativity of

¹ Jakobson, R. Linguistics in Relation to Other Sciences.— In: "Selected Works".
The Hague, v. 11, p. 659.

language so often referred to in this work, lies in this particular category
of language science—meaning.

The variability of meanings caused by the multifarious practical
application of the basic (fundamental) meaning when used in speech
has led to the birth of a notion known as polysemanticism.
This is a linguistic category which contains a great degree of ambiguity.
On the one hand, we perceive meaning as a representation of a definite
concept by means of a word. On the other hand, we state that the same
concept may be expressed by different meanings all belonging to the sa-
me word.

Still more confusing is the well-recognized fact that different con-
cepts may be expressed by one and the same word. But such is the very
nature of language, where contradiction, ambiguity and uncertainty run
parallel with rigidity, strictness and conformity to standard require-
ments of grammatical acceptability.

S. D. Katznelson remarks in this connection that "a lexical meaning
may... conflict with the basic functional meaning of its class remaining,
however, within its own class."¹

The ability of a word to be polysemantic, i. e. to comprise several
lexical meanings, becomes a crucial issue for stylistic studies. It must
be clearly understood that the multitude of meanings that a word may
have is not limited by dictionaries where this multitude has already been
recognized and fixed. Some meanings, which for the time being have
not as yet been recognized as legitimate members of the semantic struc-
ture of the given word, may, in the course of time, through frequent use
become such and subsequently become fixed in dictionaries. Convin-
cing proof of this are the so-called addenda to new editions of dictiona-
ries where new meanings are presented as already recognized facts of
language.

A stylistic approach to the issue in question takes into consideration
the fact that every word, no matter how rich in meanings it may be,
leaves the door open for new shades and nuances and even for independent
meanings. True, such meanings are not always easily accepted as nor-
mal. Moreover, many of them are rejected both by scholars and the peop-
le and therefore are not recognized as facts of language. Such meanings
become obscure in the family of lexical meanings of a word; they can
only be traced back to the original use. However, some of these meanings
are occasionally re-established in the vocabulary at a later time.

Lexical meaning, be it repeated, is a conventional category. Very
frequently it does not reflect the properties of the thing or the phenome-
non it refers to. However, some meanings are said to be motivated, i.e.
they point to some quality or feature of the object. The conventional
character of meaning can best be illustrated by the following example.
In Russian the word 'белье' is a general term denoting all kinds of ar-
ticles made from flax: underwear, household articles, shirts and so on.
The origin of the word is белый (white). In English this concept is de-

¹ Кацнельсон С. Д. Типология языка и речевое мышление. Л., 1972, с. 154.

noted by the word 'linen', which is the name of the material (Latin li-
num — flax) from which the articles mentioned were made. In German
the same concept is 'die Wasche', i.e. something that can be washed, a
process, not the material, not the colour. The concept from which all
meanings branch off is known as the inner form of the word.

So we see that different properties, essential, non-essential, optio-
nal and even accidental may be taken to name the object. The chosen
property in the course of time loses its semantic significance and depen-
dence on the inner form and the word begins to function in the language
as a generic term, a sign for various objects.

Here we approach the theory of signs, which is so important in under-
standing the relative character of language units and their functioning.

By a sign, generally speaking, we understand one material object
capable of denoting another object or idea. The essential property of a
sign is its relatively conventional character. A sign does not possess
the properties of the object it denotes. It is made to denote another ob-
ject by its very nature. In other words, people impose on certain objects
the quality to denote other objects. Thus, a flag is the sign of a nation
(state), a cross is the sign of Christianity, a plain gold ring is the sign of
marriage, a uniform is the sign of a definite calling or profession, a crown
is the sign of monarchy. These are sign-symbols. There are also signs
which are not material objects.

The science that deals with the general theory of signs is called s e-
m i о t i с s. It embraces different systems of signs,— traffic signs, com-
munication between different species of living beings, etc.

The following is a widely recognized definition of a sign:

"A sign is a material, sensuously perceived object (phenomenon,
action) appearing in the process of cognition and communication in the
capacity of a representative (substitute) of another object (or objects)
and used for receiving, storing, recasting and transforming information
about this object." ¹

Signs are generally used in a definite system showing the interrela-
tions and interdependence of the components of the system. This system
is called a code. Thus we speak of a language code which consists of
different signs—lexical, phonetic, morphological, syntactical and sty-
listic. Every code is easily recognized by its users, they understand the
nature, meaning, significance and interrelation of the signs comprising
the given code. Moreover, the user of the code must be well aware of
possible obstacles in deciphering the meaning of different signs.

This presupposes a preliminary knowledge not only of the basic
meanings of the signs in question but also the derivative meanings and
the minimum of semes of each meaning.

One of the essential features of a sign, as has been stated above, is
its conventional, arbitrary character. However, the language system,
unlike other semiotic systems, has the following distinctive feature:
having once been established and having been in circulation for some
period of time, it becomes resistant to substitutions. No effort to repla-

¹ Резников Л. Гносеологические вопросы семиотики. Л., 1965, с. 9.

се a sound, or a morpheme, or a word, not to mention a structural pattern,
has been successful. If an innovation is forced by reiterated usage into
the language-as-a-system it inevitably undergoes a certain modification
of its meaning (ideographic or stylistic).

It will be noticed here that we often speak of signs and meanings,
having in mind words. To clear up possible ambiguity let us make it
clear that words are units of language which can be compared to signs,
for they are materialized manifestations of ideas, things, phenomena,
events, actions, properties and other concepts, whereas meanings are
the products of our mental decisions. The materialized manifestations
of words take the form either of a chain of vowel and consonant sounds
(sound waves) or of a chain of graphical signs which are the interpreta-
tion of these sounds. Meanings are not material phenomena. That is why
we frequently meet the definition of the word as having a twofold nature:
material and spiritual. The form of the word which, as has been stated
above, also contains meaning differs from the word only in one respect,
viz. it is not independent, in other words, it cannot be used autonomously.
It is always a part of a word.

For example, the word spirit is a self-sustained unit. But the suffix
- al in spiritual is not so, though it possesses both material form and a
meaning (grammatical: a unit that can form and adjective).

This contradictory nature of a word is the source by which its semantic
wholeness, on the one hand, and its diversity on the other, is caused.
The study of how words gradually develop, change and lose their
meaning and acquire new ones is the subject of lexicology and lexi-
cography.

A wordcan be defined as a unit of language functioning within the sentence or within a part of it which by its sound or graphical form ex- presses a concrete or abstract notion ora grammatical notion through one of its meanings and which is capable of enriching its semantic struc- ture by acquiring new meanings and losing old ones.

To explain the semantic structure of a word is not an easy task. Only
lexicographers know how difficult it is. This difficulty is mainly caused
by the very nature of the word. It may in some circumstances reveal such
overtones of meaning as are not elements of the code.

The following analogy will not come amiss. There are in nature sounds
that we do not hear, there is light that we do not see, and heat that we
do not feel. Special apparatus is necessary to detect these phenomena.
Almost the same can be said about almost every language sign: sound,
morpheme, word, sentence, stylistic device. These signs can bring to
life subtleties of meaning which are passed unnoticed by the untrained
mind and which can be detected only through the employment of a spe-
cial method, called supralinear analysis. This method
requires some faith in intuition. Most scholars, however, rely on well-
verified facts to the detriment of the evidence of the senses.¹ Max Born,
the physicist, gives a well verified example. He says that if we speak of
vacillations and waves in space, we necessarily presuppose the existence

¹ See Борн М. Физика в жизни моего поколения. М., 1963, с. 34.

of the object to which the verb 'vacillate' refers.¹ It will be a violation
of this well-established law if we use a verb not having in mind (explic-
itly or implicitly) the object to which it refers.

We have dealt at some length with such concepts as meaning and sign
because these are the crucial issues of stylistics. Nothing can ever be
achieved in stylistic studies without a thorough understanding of these
highly complicated notions.

There is a difference in the treatment of the potentialities of language
signs in grammar, phonetics and lexicology, on the one hand, and in
stylistics, on the other. In stylistics we take it for granted that a word
has an almost unlimited potentiality of acquiring new meanings, whereas
in lexicology this potentiality is restricted to semantic and grammatical
acceptability. In stylistics the intuitive, and therefore to a very great
extent subjective, perception of meaning in words is raised to the level
of actuality. The issue touched upon here is the well-known contradis-
tinction between the scientific (abstract), intellectually precise percep-
tion of world phenomena and the sensory, intuitive, vague and uncertain
impressions of an artistic perception of these same phenomena. Max Born
has it somewhat differently: "The representatives of one group do not
want to reject or to sacrifice the idea of the absolute and therefore remain
faithful to everything subjective. They create a picture of the world
which is not the result of a systemic method, but of the unexplained ac-
tivity of religious, artistic or poetic expressions of other people. Here
reign religious zeal, aspirations to brotherhood, and often fanaticism,
intolerance and the suppression of intellect... The representatives of
the opposing group, on the contrary, reject the idea of the absolute. They
discover frequently with horror that inner feelings cannot be expressed
in comprehensible forms."²

Leaving aside the rather ambiguous pronouncement concerning the
aspirations of those who adhere to the idea of the absolute, we cannot but
admit that those who reject the intuitive in the analysis of language phe-
nomena are prone to suppress everything which arises from a sensory
perception of language-in-action, thus overlooking the fact that the
intuitive is in the long run the result of accumulated social experience.

It is of paramount importance in stylistics to bear in mind that con-
cepts of objective reality have different degrees of abstractness. This
is adequately manifested in language. Adjectives are more abstract in
meaning than nouns. Adverbs may be considered more abstract than
adjectives inasmuch as they usually characterize an abstract notion,
action or state. Conjunctions and prepositions have a still higher degree
of abstractness because it is not objects as such that they indicate, but
the correlation of the concepts involved. Therefore we may consider
conjunctions and prepositions, and some auxiliary words as well, to be
on the border line between lexical and grammatical categories, or in
terms of meaning, having a grammatical meaning which suppresses the
lexical meaning.

¹ Ibid., p. 45.

² Ibid., p. 13.

Within the grammatical classes of words there are also different de-
grees of abstractness. Nouns, as is known, are divided into two large class-
es, abstract and concrete. But this division does not correspond to the
actual difference in the degree of abstractness. This will be explained
later when we come to illustrate abstractness and concreteness.

A word, as is known, generalizes. Consequently, a word will always
denote a concept, no matter whether it names a definite object of em-
braces all the objects of a given kind.

The problem of abstractness, and especially the degree of abstractness,
is of vital importance in stylistics in more than one respect. Stylistics
deals not only with the aesthetic and emotional impact of the language.
It also studies the means of producing impressions in our mind. Impres-
sion is the first and rudimentary stage of concept. But the concept through
a reverse process may build another kind of impression. Impressions
that are secondary to concepts, in other words, which have been born by
concepts, are called imagery.

Imagery is mainly produced by the interplay of different meanings.
Concrete objects are easily perceived by the senses. Abstract notions are
perceived by the mind. When an abstract notion is by the force of the
mind represented through a concrete object, an image is the result.
Imagery may be built on the interrelation of two abstract notions or two
concrete objects or an abstract and a concrete one.

Three types of meaning can be distinguished, which we shall call logical, emotive and nominal respectively.

Logical meaning is the precise naming of a feature of the
idea, phenomenon or object, the name by which we recognize the whole
of the concept. This meaning is also synonymously called referential
meaning or direct meaning. We shall use the terms logical and referen-
tial as being most adequate for our purpose.

Referential meanings are liable to change. As a result the referential
meanings of one word may denote different concepts. It is therefore nec-
essary to distinguish between primary and secondary referential, or
logical, meaning.

Thus, the adverb inwardly has the primary logical meaning of 'in-
ternally', or 'within'. Its secondary logical meanings are: 'towards the
centre', 'mentally', 'secretly', which are to some extent derived from the
primary meaning.¹ Some dictionaries give a very extended list of pri-
mary and secondary logical meanings, and it is essential for stylistic
purposes to distinguish them, as some stylistic devices are built on the
interplay of primary and secondary logical meanings.

All the meanings fixed by authoritative English and American dic-
tionaries comprise what is called the semantic structure
of the wоrd. The meanings that are to be found in speech or writing
and which are accidental should not be regarded as components of the
semantic structure of the word. They may be transitory, inasmuch as
they depend on the context. They are contextual meanings.

¹ Such meanings are therefore also called derivative meanings

Let us compare the meaning of the word presence in the following two
sentences.

"The governer said that he would not allow the presence of

federal troops on the soil of his State."

"...the General has been faced with the problem of the country's

presence on foreign soil, the stubborn resistance of officers and offi-
cials..."

In the first sentence the word presence merely means '...the state of
being present', whereas in the second sentence the meaning of the word
expands into '...occupation', i.e. the seizure and control of an area, es-
pecially foreign territory, by military forces.

The first meaning is the dictionary meaning of the word. The second
meaning is a contextual one. It lives only in the given text and disappears
if the context is altered. However, there are definite reasons to assume
that a number of derivative meanings are given place in dictionaries on
the basis of contextual meanings. When the two meanings clearly co-exist
in the utterance, we say there is an interaction of dictionary and contex-
tual meanings. When only one meaning is perceived by the reader, we are
sure to find this meaning in dictionaries as a derivative one.

Sometimes it is difficult to decide whether there is a simultaneous
materialization of two dictionary logical meanings or an interplay of a
dictionary and a contextual meaning. The difficulty is caused, on the
one hand, by insufficient objective criteria of what should be fixed in
dictionaries as already established language facts and, on the other hand,
by deliberate political, aesthetic, moral and other considerations on the
part of the compilers of the dictionaries.

Thus, in Byron's use of the word arise in the line "Awake, ye sons
of Spain, awake, arise!" the word arise has the long-established meaning
of 'revolt'. It is not contextual any longer. But no English or American
dictionary fixes this particular meaning in the semantic structure of the
word, and it is left to the ability of the attentive reader to supply the
obvious meaning.

The same can be said about the word appeasement. There is an impli-
cit difference in the treatment of the semantic structure of this word in
British and American dictionaries. In no British dictionary will you
find the new derivative meaning, viz. 'a sacrifice of moral principle in
order to avert aggression'. Some modern American dictionaries include
this meaning in the semantic structure of the word 'appeasement'. The
reason for the difference is apparent—the British prime minister Cham-
berlain in 1938 played an ignoble role in Munich, sacrificing Czechoslova-
kia to Hitler's greed. The new meaning that was attached to the word (in
connection with this historical event) cannot now be removed from its
semantic structure.

A dictionary meaning is materialized in the context; a contextual
meaning is born in the context. However, dictionaries, though the only
reliable sources of information regarding the meanings of a given word,
apply very diverse and even contradictory principles in ascertaining
the general acceptability and recognition of some of the shades of mea-
ning which are in process of being shaped as independent meanings.

Thus, to excuse oneself in the meaning of 'to leave', as in 'Soames excused
himself directly after dinner' (Galsworthy); or the meaning of a thought = 'a
little' as in 'A thought more fashionably than usual' (Galsworthy) are
fixed as separate meanings in some modern British and American dic-
tionaries, but are neglected in others.

Every word possesses an enormous potentiality for generating new
meanings. This power is often under-estimated by scholars who regard
a word as a unit complete in itself and acknowledge a new-born meaning
only when it has firmly asserted itself in language and become accepted
by the majority of the language community. But not to see the latent
possibilities of a word is not to understand the true nature of this unit
of language.

The potentiality of words can also be noted in regard to emotive
meaning. Emotive meaning also materializes a concept in the word,
but, unlike logical meaning, emotive meaning has reference not directly
to things or phenomena of objective reality, but to the feelings and emo-
tions of the speaker towards these things or to his emotions as such.
Therefore the emotive meaning bears reference to things, phenomena or
ideas through a kind of evaluation of them. For example:

I feel so darned lonely. (Graham Green, "The Quiet American".)
He classified him as a man of monstrous selfishness; he did not

want to see that knife descend, but he felt it for one great fleeting

instant. (London)

The italicized words have no logical meaning, only emotive meaning.
Their function is to reveal the subjective, evaluating attitude of the writ-
er to the things or events spoken of. Men-of-letters themselves are well
aware that words may reveal a subjective evaluation and sometimes use
it for definite stylistic effects, thus calling the attention of the reader to
the meaning of such words. Thus, for example, in the following passage
from "The Man of Property" by Galsworthy:

"She was not a flirt, not even a coquette —words dear to the heart
of his generation, which loved to define things by a good, broad, ina-
dequate word—but she was dangerous."

Here the words 'flirt' and 'coquette' retain some of their logical mean-
ing. They mean a person (particularly a girl) who endeavours to attract
the opposite sex, who toys with her admirers. But both words have acquir-
ed an additional significance, viz. a derogatory shade of meaning. This
shade may grow into an independent meaning and in this case will be
fixed in dictionaries as having a special emotive meaning, as, for example,
have the words fabulous, terrifying, stunning, spectacular, swell, top,
smart, cute, massive and the like.

Many words acquire an emotive meaning only in a definite context.
In that case we say that the word has acontextual emotive
meaning.

Stephen Ullmann holds that

"Only the context can show whether a word should be taken as
a purely objective expression, or whether it is primarily designed to

convey and arouse emotions. This is obvious in the case of words
like liberty, and justice, which are frequently charged with emotional
implications. But even colourless everyday terms may, in freak con-
texts, acquire unexpected emotional overtones, as, for instance, 'wall'
in this passage from a Midsummer Night's Dream:

'And thou, О wall, О sweet, О lovely wall,
...Thanks, courteous wall... О wicked wall.'"¹

Ullmann's point of view is only partly true. There are, of course,
words which, as we have pointed out, may acquire emotive meaning in a
context. Ordinarily though, and particularly when taken as isolated
lexical units, they can hardly be said to possess emotive meaning. But
Ullmann's opinion that only the context can inject emotive meaning
into words, contradicts the facts. In the vocabulary of almost any Euro-
pean language there are words which are undoubtedly bearers of emotive
meaning. These are interjections, oaths or swear-words, exclamatory
words (variants of interjections) and a great number of qualitative or
intensifying adjectives some of which have already been mentioned. The
emotive meaning of some of these classes of words is so strong that it
suppresses the co-existing logical meaning, as, for example, in stunning
and smart. It is significant that these words are explained in dictionaries
by means of synonymous words charged with strong emotional implica-
tions, i. e. words that direct the mind not to objective things, ideas or
phenomena but to the feelings. Thus, the word smart is explained in
"The Penguin English Dictionary" thus: "stinging, pungent, keen; vig-
orous, brisk; clever, intelligent; impertinent; shrewd; witty; spruce,
neat, gay, fashionable!"²

Other classes of words with emotive meaning have entirely lost their
logical meaning and function in the language as interjections. Such
words as alas, oh, ah, pooh, darn, gosh and the like have practically no
logical meaning at all; words like the devil, Christ, God, goodness graci-
ous, etc., are frequently used only in their emotive meaning. The same
can be said about the words bloody, damn and other expletives.

Contrary to Stephen Ullmann, we think that emotive meaning is
inherent in a definite group of words and adherent to many words de-
noting emotions and feelings even when taken out of the context.

Ullmann's example of the word wall as bearing strong emotive mean-
ing does not stand scrutiny. He overlooks the real bearers of emotive
meaning, viz. the words preceding or following it: 0, sweet, lovely (these
three words are repeated several times), courteous, wicked. It goes without
saying that these words strongly colour³ the word wall, but no emotive
meaning as a counterpart of logical meaning can be observed here.

¹ Ullmann, Stephen. Words and their Use. Frederick Muller, Ldn, 1951, p. 28,

² "The Penguin English Dictionary" edited by G. N. Garmonsway.

³ Colouring is a loose term. It is used here as a synonym to contextual emotive
meaning. But it may be used further on when we want to point out the effect on the ut-
terance as a whole of a word with a strong emotive meaning.

3* 67

Emotive meaning of words plays an important role in stylistics.
Therefore it should never be underrated. A very keen eye or ear will
always distinguish elements of emotive meaning. Emotional colouring
may be regarded as a rudimentary stage of emotive meaning. This is
generally fixed as an independent meaning in good dictionaries. Anything
recognizable as having a strong impact on our senses may be considered
as having emotive meaning, either dictionary or contextual.

And finally we come to nominal meaning. There are words
which, while expressing concepts, indicate a particular object out of
a class. In other words, these units of the language serve the purpose of
singling out one definite and singular object out of a whole class of sim-
ilar objects. These words are classified in grammars as proper nouns.
The nature of these words can be understood if we have a clear idea of
the difference between the two main aspects of a word: "nomination" and
"signification". These aspects are also called "reference" and "significa-
tion" or "denotation" and "connotation". The difference can roughly be
illustrated by the following example.

Let us take the word table. The first thing that appears in our mind
is the general notion deprived of any concrete features or properties. This
is the signification. But by the word table we may also denote a definite
table. In this case we use a definite article and the meaning becomes nom-
inating. But we may also fix a definite name to the object which we
want to be recognized as a unique object because of its peculiar proper-
ties. In this way proper names appear. Their function is not to single
out one of the objects of the class for one particular occasion, as in the
case with the use of the definite article, but to make it the bearer of the
properties which our mind has attached to it. Thus nominal meaning is
a derivative logical meaning. To distinguish nominal meaning from
logical meaning the former is designated by a capital letter. Such words
as Smith, Longfellow, Everest, Black Sea, Thames, Byron are said to
have nominal meaning. The logical meaning from which they originate
may in the course of time be forgotten and therefore not easily traced
back. Most proper names have nominal meanings which may be regarded
as homonyms of common nouns with their logical or emotive meanings,
as Hope, Browning, Taylor, Scotland, Black, Chandler, Chester (from the
Latin word castra —'camp'). Hence logical meanings which nominate an
object, at the same time signify the whole class of these objects. Nominal
meanings which nominate an object are deprived of the latter function
because they do not represent a class. It must be remembered, however,
that the nominal meaning will always be secondary to the logical mean-
ing.

The process of development of meaning may go still further. A nom-
inal meaning may assume a logical meaning due to certain external cir-
cumstances. The result is that a logical meaning takes its origin in a nom-
inal meaning. Some feature of a person which has made him or her no-
ticeable and which is recognized by the community is made the basis
for the new logical meaning. Thus dunce (a dullard, a stupid person) is
derived from the personal name, Duns Scotus, a medieval scholastic;
hoolgian (a ruffian) is probably derived from the name of a rowdy fam-

ily, cf. the Irish name Houligan, in a comic song popular about 1885;
boycott (refuse to do business with, combine together against a person by
breaking off all relations with him). The verb boycott was first used in
1880 to describe the action of the Land League towards Captain Boycott,
an Irish landlord. The nominal meanings of these words have now faded
away and we perceive only one, the logical meaning. But sometimes the
process of attaching nominal meaning to a word with a logical meaning
takes place, as it were, before our eyes. This is done for purely stylistic
purposes and is regarded as a special stylistic device (see p. 164).